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Old Problem, New Tactic:
Making the Case for Legislation to Combat
Employment Discrimination Based on Family
Caregiver Status
NOREEN FARRELL*
GENEVIEVE GUERTIN**
INTRODUCTION
Just before Heidi Philipsen was offered a position at the University
of Michigan, she was asked one last question by a supervisor who said:
"I've got an offer for you. Before I give it to you, I have a question...
Are you sure you don't want to stay at home to be with your
children[?]"'
After Kristy Ackerman was terminated while on maternity leave,
her employer offered this reassurance: "[T]he way I see it, it is a win-win
situation for you[-]you get to stay [at] home with your new babies and
draw unemployment at the same time."
2
Firefighter and single father Derek Tisinger was denied a promotion
after availing himself of the fire department's commonly used shift-
trading policy because he used shift trading to cover childcare
obligations. Tisinger was counseled to "explore alternative methods of
* Noreen Farrell is a litigating attorney with Equal Rights Advocates (ERA), a legal advocacy
organization located in San Francisco, California devoted to the civil rights of women and girls, that
focuses on impact litigation, free advice and counseling, legislation, and policy work. In 2007, ERA
was one of the co-sponsors of California Senate Bill 836, which proposed legislation to amend the
California Fair Employment and Housing Act to expressly prohibit employment discrimination based
on "familial status."
** Genevieve Guertin is a former ERA intern who received her J.D. from the University of
California, Hastings College of the Law, in 2008. The Authors thank the Center for Work Life Law at
University of California, Hastings College of the Law, its Director, Professor Joan Williams, and
Associate Director, Stephanie Bornstein, as well as Hastings Professor David Faigman for their
research, guidance, and invaluable feedback with respect to this Article.
i. Philipsen v. Univ. of Mich., No. o6-CV-II 9 7 7 -DT, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25898, at *7-8 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 22, 2007).
2. Ackerman v. Quilcene Sch. Dist., No. 29300-5-II, 2003 Wash. App. LEXIS 1711, at *6 (Wash.
Ct. App. July 29, 2003).
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providing child care," even though he always ensured coverage of his
shifts as required by the shift-trading policy.'
These family caregivers suffered discrimination at work due to their
status as caregivers, but were denied relief because their claims did not
fall neatly within the confines of existing antidiscrimination law.
Discrimination against employees based on their status as parents or
family caregivers occurs at an alarming rate in this country, but is hardly
a new phenomenon. Family Responsibilities Discrimination (FRD)
stems from negative stereotypes by employers about work commitment
of employees who also are, or are perceived to be, caregivers.4 These
erroneous assumptions have resulted in discrimination in hiring and
promotions, demotions, retaliation for lawful leaves of absence, and
wrongful terminations!
FRD disproportionately impacts working mothers,6 which explains
the prominence of gender discrimination claims in FRD litigation. As the
face of FRD has changed, advocates are looking to new legislation that
expressly prohibits discrimination based on parental or family caregiver
status.7 This Article examines FRD legislation passed or proposed in
recent years, challenging criticism of this strategy by Professor Peggie
Smith, who addressed whether "parental status" should be a protected
class in her article Parental-Status Employment Discrimination: A Wrong
in Need of a Right?.8 Professor Smith challenges the idea that parent-
3. Tisinger v. City of Bakersfield, No. Fo36469, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3560, at *2 (Cal.
Ct. App. Feb. 27,2002).
4. JOAN C. WILLIAMS & CYNTHIA CALVERT, Introduction to WORKLIFE LAW'S GUIDE TO FAMILY
RESPONSIBILITIES DISCRIMINATION (2006).
5. For a comprehensive discussion about the various facets of family responsibilities, see Joan
Williams & Consuela Pinto, Family Responsibilities Discrimination: Don't Get Caught Off Guard, 22
LAB. LAW. 293, 293-94 (2007) (citing Pamela Babcock, Detecting Hidden Bias: You May Not See It, But
It's Probably Lurking Among Your Managers-And Perhaps Even In You, 51 HR MAG. 5o (2006)
(discussing unexamined biases in the workplace)).
6. FRD disproportionately impacts working mothers, pregnant women or women that are of
child-rearing age that may become pregnant. See, e.g., U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION CHARGES: EEOP & FEPA's COMBINED: FY 19 92-FY 2007,
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/pregnanc.html (last visited June I, 20o8); Enforcement Guidance: Unlawful
Disparate Treatment of Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 615
(May 23, 2007), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.pdf [hereinafter EEOC
Guidance] (citing Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women's
Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
371, 378-8o (2001), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.pdf (discussing women's
continued role as primary caregivers in our society and citing studies)).
7. See discussion infra Part I and accompanying notes.
8. Peggie R. Smith, Parental-Status Employment Discrimination: A Wrong in Need of a Right?,
35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 569 (2002) [hereinafter Smith, Parental-Status]. Professor Smith has made
other important contributions to the work/life debate. For example, Professor Smith has contributed
important work regarding the exploitation of paid care workers. See, e.g., Peggie R. Smith, Regulating
Paid Household Work: Class, Gender, Race and Agendas of Reform, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 851 (1999).
Professor Smith has also explored different legislative models for new federal statutes. See Peggie R.
[VOL. 59:1463
June 2008] LEGISLATING CAREGIVER DISCRIMINATION
employees should be protected under an employment discrimination
model.9 She argues that establishing parental status as a protected class
would not result in many practical advantages to caregiver employees,
and would likely offer many of the doctrinal and practical disadvantages
associated with the formal equality model of antidiscrimination law.'0 She
also raises concerns about the ability of the Equal Employment
Opportunities Commission (EEOC) to handle claims based on yet
another protected class." Questioning the role of caregiver stereotyping
in adverse employment actions, Professor Smith ultimately suggests a
strengthening of accommodation laws instead.'2
Many of Professor Smith's points are well taken, especially given the
narrow focus of the article on whether parental status should be
established as a protected class. However, in the six years since her
article was published, convincing developments in stereotyping research,
FRD cases and legislation, as well as the EEOC's view of FRD claims,
compel a different conclusion than the one drawn by Professor Smith.
Here is what we have learned: FRD cases are on the rise, and they
cross gender and race boundaries. 3 Family caregivers who face
discrimination at work are not limited to parents.' 4 Research has
confirmed the impact of caregiver stereotyping on the hiring, promotion,
and working conditions of employees, and is now so well accepted that
the EEOC has acknowledged the unique features of FRD cases.'5 We
have learned that accommodation laws alone are not an FRD fix because
not all family caregivers need the protection of accommodation laws, and
ultimately such laws do not combat discriminatory biases that drive many
adverse employment actions against family caregivers. Courts have been
reluctant to extend public policy protection against discriminatory
terminations based on caregiver status," perhaps because legislation
expressly prohibiting FRD is still developing. Whether particular FRD
claims give rise to liability remains a source of confusion for employees
and employers alike.
This convincing set of data makes a strong case for legislation
expressly prohibiting FRD. Working in tandem with accommodation
Smith, Accommodating Routine Parental Obligations in an Era of Work-Family Conflict: Lessons from
Religious Accommodations, 2001 Wis. L. REv. 1443 (2001).
9. See Smith, Parental-Status, supra note 8, at 569-73.
io. Id. at 585-612.
ii. Id. at 6io-12.
12. Id. at 613-21.
13. See infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
14. See Simpson v. Dist. of Columbia Office of Human Rights, 597 A.2d 392, 394 (D.C. 1991)
(plaintiff's termination related to her caregiving commitments to her disabled father); see also sources
cited infra note 39.
15. See EEOC Guidance, supra note 6, at § I.B.
16. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
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laws, laws specifically prohibiting discrimination based on family
caregiver status are necessary to right this employment discrimination
wrong.
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of proposed and
enacted FRD legislation in the context of arguments suggesting
drawbacks to a "parental status" focus. Part II addresses Professor
Smith's skepticism about the role of stereotyping in employment
discrimination against caregivers. Part III explores whether the
strengthening of accommodation laws alone is the best antidote to
employment discrimination against caregivers. Part IV critiques
Professor Smith's use of the Equal Protection doctrine to evaluate
whether employees should be protected from employment
discrimination based on parental status. Part V examines a compelling
derivative effect of legislation expressly prohibiting discrimination based
on caregiver status-the establishment of public policy crucial to tort
claims challenging FRD.
I. FRD LEGISLATION PROVIDES GREATER WORKER PROTECTION
With FRD cases on the rise 7 that cross gender and race boundaries, 1"
employee advocates have availed themselves of a variety of legal theories
17. The Center for WorkLife Law at University of California, Hastings College of the Law has
documented a nearly 400% increase in FRD-related cases in the last ten years, as compared to the
prior decade. MARY STILL, LITIGATING THE MATERNAL WALL: U.S. LAWSUITS CHARGING DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST WORKERS WITH FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES 7 (2oo6), available at http://www.uchastings.edu/
site files/WLL/ FRDreport.pdf.
I8. The EEOC has recognized that men's role in family caregiving has increased. "Between 1965
and 2003, the amount of time that men spent on childcare nearly tripled ...." EEOC Guidance, supra
note 6 (citing Donna St. George, Fathers Are No Longer Glued to Their Recliners, WASH. POST, Mar.
20, 2007, at Ai I (noting men's childcare work increased from 2.5 hours to 7 hours per week between
1965 and 2003)). The Center for WorkLife Law at University of California, Hastings College of the
Law has reported that 8% of claimants are men; they typically claim that they were denied leave
available to women. Joan Williams, Family Responsibilities Discrimination: The Next Generation of
Employment Discrimination Cases, in 36TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 2007, at 336 (2
PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No. H-762, 2007). The EEOC has also
recognized that effects of caregiving responsibilities are more pronounced among some women of
color, particularly African American women, who have a long history of working outside the home,
are more likely to be employed than other women raising children, and more likely to be raising
children in a single parent household than white or Asian American women. EEOC Guidance, supra
note 6 (citing Lynette Clemetson, Work vs. Family, Complicated by Race, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2o06, at
Gi (discussing unique work-family conflicts faced by African American women)); see also LONNAE
O'NEAL PARKER, I'M EVERY WOMAN: REMIXED STORIES OF MARRIAGE, MOTHERHOOD, AND WORK 29
(2005); JENNIFER TUCKER & LESLIE R. WOLFE, DEFINING WORK AND FAMILY ISSUES: LISTENING TO THE
VOICES OF WOMEN OF COLOR 4 (1994); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT No.
996, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK 13 tbl.5 (2006), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-
databook-2oo6.pdf (reporting that in 2005, 68% of African American women with children under the
age of three were in the workforce compared with 58% of white women, 53% of Asian American
women, and 45% of Hispanic women); Population Reference Bureau, Diversity, Poverty Characterize
Female Headed Households, http://www.prb.org/Articles/2003/DiversityPovertyCharacterizeFemale
HeadedHouseholds.aspx (last visited June I, 2008) (reporting that about 5% of white or Asian
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to combat employment discrimination against caregivers." The most
commonly used strategies include couching FRD claims in terms of
unlawful gender discrimination in violation of any of: Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),"2 Pregnancy Discrimination Act
("PDA"),2' and the Equal Pay Act of 1963 ("EPA").22 Other theories of
liability include unlawful denial or interference with or retaliation for the
lawful exercise of rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 199 3("FMLA"),23 unlawful discrimination in violation of the .Association
Clause of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 199o ("ADA"), 24
unlawful denial of benefits under the Employment Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"),25 and violation of a variety of state
and/or common law theories of law.
6
Advocates have successfully relied on these theories of liability,
especially when brought on behalf of women, who are the likeliest to
face caregiver discrimination at work. 7 However, these theories have
limitations and do not cover all discriminatory practices. For example,
firefighter Derek Tisinger was viewed as not sufficiently committed to
work and was subsequently denied a promotion based on his caregiving
duties." In fact, his caregiver duties did not interfere with work and
Tisinger was not seeking an accommodation at work or protection under
family medical leave laws. 9 Rather, Tisinger brought suit under the
American households are female-headed households with children compared with 22% of African
American households and 14% of Hispanic households). The EEOC acknowledged that women of
color may devote more time to caring for extended family members. Tavia Simmons & Jane Lawler
Dye, Grandparents Living with Grandchildren: 20o0, at 3 tbl.i (Dep't of Commerce, U.S. Census
Bureau, Oct. 2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2003pubs/c2kbr-3I.pdf (showing a higher proportion of African American and Native American
grandmothers responsible for raising grandchildren than white, Asian, or Hispanic grandmothers).
19. See generally Williams & Pinto, supra note 5, at 299-327 (providing a comprehensive
overview of strategies used to combat FRD); see also WILLIAMS & CALVERT, supra note 4.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006); see, e.g., Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless, Corp., 217
F.3d 30, 46 (Ist Cir. 2000).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe(k) (2006). This includes women who may become pregnant. U.A.W. v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206 (1991).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 2o6(d) (2006).
23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 26Ol-2654,5 U.S.C. §§ 6381-6385 (2006); see, e.g., Liu v. Amway, Corp., 347 F.3 d
1125, 1131-33 (9th Cir. 2003).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (2005); see, e.g., Jackson v. Serv. Eng'g, 96 F. Supp. 2d 873, 878 (S.D.
Ind. 2000).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2006).
26. State common law actions include wrongful discharge, breach of contract, and implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See, e.g., Joan Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal
Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
77, 157-60 (2003).
27. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
28. Tisinger v. City of Bakersfield, No. Fo36 469, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3560, at *2 (Cal.
Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2002).
29. See id. at *2-8, *17-18.
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California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA")3 ° for
discrimination based on his marital status as a single father.3 Although a
jury found in his favor, the California Court of Appeal overturned the
verdict based on its conclusion that Tisinger was actually complaining of
discrimination based on his status as a caregiver, a group that is not a
protected class under California law.32
Tisinger may have had a claim for gender discrimination under the
FEHA and federal law if he had alleged that the fire department was
discriminating on the basis of a gendered stereotype about what is
traditionally viewed as "women's work." However, not all plaintiffs or
their advocates understand the application of gender stereotypes to male
caregivers in developing litigation strategies. Judges and jurors may be
even less able to follow such complicated and novel theories in litigation.
Moreover, by relying too heavily on a gender discrimination model to
combat FRD, advocates risk perpetuating the stereotype that family
caregiving is "women's work."
Perhaps in recognition that not all FRD claims fit neatly within
existing theories of liability, and that accommodation laws do not remedy
discrimination, several states and a number of localities have addressed
FRD head on with legislation expressly prohibiting discrimination based
on parental status, familial status, and family responsibilities.33 Notably,
the laws falling within this new wave of FRD legislation prohibit
employment actions motivated by discrimination; they do not broaden
existing leave or other accommodation laws.34 An examination of these
variations is crucial in determining the effectiveness of such legislation to
combat FRD, especially in light of Professor Smith's criticism of
prohibiting discrimination based on "parental status.
35
Alaska's FRD statute provides a model for review. That statute
prohibits employment discrimination based, inter alia, on "parenthood"
as follows:
It is determined and declared as a matter of legislative finding that
discrimination against an inhabitant of the state because of race,
religion, color, national origin, age, sex, physical or mental disability,
marital status, changes in marital status, pregnancy, or parenthood is a
matter of public concern and that this discrimination not only threatens
the rights and privileges of the inhabitants of the state but also
menaces the institutions of the state and threatens peace, order, health,
safety, and general welfare of the state and its inhabitants.
36
30. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12996 (2008).
31. Tisinger, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 356o, at *3-4.
32. Id. at *1-2.
33. See, e.g., infra notes 36, 42, 46, and accompanying text.
34. See generally infra notes 36, 42, 46, and accompanying text.
35. See Smith, Parental-Status, supra note 8, at 569-73.
36. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.200 (2006) (emphasis added). A number of cities have passed
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Professor Smith's primary concern with efforts to make parental
status a protected class is that both men and women are parents.37 If
fathers and mothers are equally ill-treated with respect to their parental
status, a claim for discrimination cannot be made." The point is well
taken, and demonstrates just one of the flaws in too narrow an approach
to FRD. Studies and cases since Professor Smith's article also suggest
that its focus on the propriety of protection based on parental status is
too narrow because not all family caregivers are parents. For example,
grandparents, grandchildren, in-laws, aunts, siblings, spouses, and
partners are just some of the family members that will receive and give
care at high rates in this country.39
In 2007, a more inclusive model was introduced in the California
legislature as part of a proposed amendment to FEHA. ° California
Senate Bill 836 had the potential to address both of the above-referenced
limitations of the "parental status" model by expanding the scope of
caregivers protected, and by also including an element that focused on
actual caregiving as opposed to just a person's status.'
Departing from the Alaska "parenthood" model, a California Senate
Bill proposed adding "familial status" as a protected class under the
FEHA's employment provisions, just as it is currently included in the
Act's housing provisions, as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice, unless based upon a bona
fide occupational qualification, or, except where based upon applicable
security regulations established by the United States or the State of
California:
(a) For an employer, because of the race, religious creed, color,
national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability,
medical condition, marital status, familial status, sex, age, or sexual
orientation of any person, to refuse to hire or employ the person
or to refuse to select the person for a training program leading to
employment, or to bar or to discharge the person from
employment or from a training program leading to employment,
"parenthood" variations. See e.g., ATLANTA, GA., ORDINANCE 2000-79, § I, (2000); CHICAGO, ILL.,
CHICAGO HUMAN RIGHTS ORDINANCE, MUNICIPAL CODE § 2-I60-020 (2007).
37. Smith, Parental-Status, supra note 8, at 569.
38. Id.
39. See EEOC Guidance, supra note 6 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., INFORMAL
CAREGIVING: COMPASSION IN ACTION (1998), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/Carebro2.
pdf; Peggie R. Smith, Elder Care, Gender, and Work: The Work-Family Issue of the 21st Century, 25
BERKELEY J. EMp. & LAB. L. 351, 355-60 (2004)); Emily Wood, The Rights of Elder Caregivers in the
Context of Family Responsibilities Discrimination (Dec. i8, 2007) (unpublished seminar paper) (on
file with the Center for WorkLife Law at University of California, Hastings College of the Law).
40. S.B. 836, 2006-07 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007) (proposed amendment to the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act authored by State Senator Sheilah Kuehl).
41. Id.
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or to discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment."
California Senate Bill 836 also distinguished itself from the Alaska FRD
statute by going a step further to define "familial status" under the
employment provision to include an individual who is or who will be
caring for or supporting a family member, as follows:
In connection with unlawful employment practices, the meaning of
"familial status" includes being an individual who is or who will be
caring for or supporting a family member.
"Caring for or supporting" means any of the following:
(i) Providing supervision or transportation.
(ii) Providing psychological or emotional comfort and support.
(iii) Addressing medical, educational, nutritional, hygienic, or
safety needs.
(iv) Attending to an illness, injury, or mental or physical
disability.43
The California Senate Bill's focus on those who actually provide
care addresses a potential risk raised when relying on status alone
because not all those with, for example, a parental "status," are providing
care and subjected to resulting discriminatory assumptions. Indeed,
ample research demonstrates that employers do not necessarily make
discriminatory assumptions about fathers." The key trigger for
discrimination against fathers appears to be when they have assumed a
primary caregiver role.45
Protection based on one's actual or perceived caregiving
responsibilities, as opposed to status alone, has been incorporated in
legislation elsewhere, including the District of Columbia, which prohibits
employment discrimination based on "familial responsibilities." The
D.C. statute provides:
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice to do any of the
following acts, wholly or partially for a discriminatory reason based
upon the actual or perceived: race, color, religion, national origin, sex,
age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, gender
42. Id. (emphasis added). An individual who "is regarded as" having this characteristic is also
protected. Id. A number of localities also have statutes that prohibit employment discrimination based
on "familial status." See, e.g., MIAMI-DADE, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § IiA-26 (2007); TAMPA, FLA.,
CODE OF ORDINANCES, HUMAN RIGHTS § 12-26 (2007); HOWARD COUNTY, MD., CODE § 12.208 (2oo8).
43. Cal. S.B. 836, 2006-07 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007).
44. See, e.g., Kathleen Fuegen et al., Mothers and Fathers in the Workplace: How Gender and
Parental Status Influence Judgments of Job-Related Competence, 6o J. Soc. ISSUES 737, 737-54 (2004).
45. See, e.g., Tisinger v. City of Bakersfield, No. Fo36469, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3560, at
*2 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2002).
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identity or expression, family responsibilities, genetic information,
disability, matriculation, or political affiliation of any individual .
While the California legislation was ultimately defeated at the
Governor's desk, its take on the "parental status" and "familial status"
statutes-to include an actual "caring" component-remedies the
drawbacks of status protection alone, and serves as a model to consider
in developing future legislation.
Drafters of the California legislation drew guidance from one of the
early pioneers of FRD legislation, New South Wales, Australia.47 The
New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Act of 1977 makes discrimination
against another person "on the ground of the aggrieved person's
responsibilities as a carer" unlawful. 4s The statute defines "carer" as
anyone who has, had, will have, or who is thought to have responsibilities
for any adult or child of whom the person is a guardian, or any
immediate family member who is in need of care or support.49
The focus of FRD legislation on "caring" is not without some
drawbacks. The purpose of including a caring component in the
definition of familial status is not to make this an element of the prima
facie case, but rather to specifically target discrimination based on
46. D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1402.11 (2001) (emphasis added).
47. New South Wales Consolidated Acts, Anti-Discrimination Act of 1977, Part 4B, §§ 49(S), (T),
(U) (2oo8), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol act/aal9772o4/.
48. Id.
49. Id. The actual wording of the statute defines "responsibilities as a carer" as a reference to the
person's responsibilities to care for or support:
(a) any child or step-child of the person (whether or not under the age of 18 years) who is:
(i) wholly or substantially dependent on the person, or
(ii) in need of care or support, or
(b) any child or adult who is in need of care or support and:
(i) of whom the person is guardian, or
(ii) for whom the person has parental responsibility under a law of the Commonwealth
or this State, or
(iii) in relation to whom the person is an authorised carer within the meaning of the
Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998, or
(c) any immediate family member of the person who is in need of care or support, being one
of the following:
(i) a spouse or former spouse of the person or of a spouse or former spouse of the
person,
(ii) a grandchild or step-grandchild of the person or of a spouse or former spouse of
the person,
(iii) d parent or step-parent of the person or of a spouse or former spouse of the
person,
(iv) a grandparent or step-grandparent of the person or of a spouse or former spouse
of the person,
(v) a brother or sister, or step-brother or sister, of the person or of a spouse or former
spouse of the person.
Id. (emphasis added).
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stereotypes about the work commitment of employees with actual or
perceived caregiving responsibilities."
Advocates and drafters face the challenge of crafting legislative
language that is specific and inclusive enough with respect to various
types of caregiving, but that also does not create unintended proof
burdens. Imprecise drafting will leave the effectiveness of legislation
specifically outlawing FRD in the hands of judges and jurors who may
have limited experience with these relatively new FRD theories.
Ultimately however, efforts to develop FRD legislation that
adequately addresses these issues must continue in order to eradicate
FRD. As set forth below, such legislation is an important means to
remedy discrimination based on stereotypes as well as to bolster and
support accommodation laws and other FRD theories of liability.
II. FRD LEGISLATION Is NEEDED TO COMBAT STEREOTYPING BASED ON
CAREGIVER STATUS
A fundamental premise of Professor Smith's criticism of affording
parental-status-based protection against employment discrimination is
that employment discrimination based on stereotyping is not a serious
problem.' Significant research since Professor Smith's article proves
quite the contrary. 2 One such study is a comprehensive review by
Stephen Benard, In Paik and Shelly J. Correll in this Issue.53 In fact,
descriptive stereotypes54 that parents, especially mothers, do not
50. Id.
51. See Smith, supra note 8, at 573 (asserting that, "when compared with the data regarding racial
or gender discrimination.., the evidence does not exist to indicate that employment discrimination
against parents based on erroneous assumptions is a serious problem").
52. See Michelle Budig & Paula England, The Wage Penalty for Motherhood, 66 AM. Soc. REv.
204, 204-25 (2001) (finding that, after controlling for other factors affecting wages, mother employees
on average suffer a 5% wage penalty per child); Amy J.C. Cuddy et al., When Professionals Become
Mothers, Warmth Doesn't Cut the Ice, 6o J. Soc. IssuEs 701, 709-11 (2oo4) (finding, in a study using
122 participants, that female employees who become mothers are perceived as warmer, but less
competent, and that participants reported less interest in hiring, promoting and educating mother-
employees relative to childless employees and father-employees); Fuegen et al., supra note 44, at 737-
54 (2004) (finding that study participants judged parents to be less committed to employment than
nonparents, and that father employees were held to a more lenient standard than were mother
employees and childless male employees); Barbara Masser et al., 'We Like You, But We Don't Want
You'- The Impact of Pregnancy in the Workplace, 57 SEx ROLEs 703, 703-12 (2007) (finding that in a
controlled study, a pregnant job candidate, a future caregiver, was recommended for a lower starting
salary and less likely to be recommended for hiring than was the non-pregnant candidate).
53. Stephen Benard, In Paik & Shelley J. Correll, Cognitive Bias and the Motherhood Penalty, 59
HASTINGS L.J. 1359 (2008).
54. See Madeline E. Heilman, Description and Prescription: How Gender Stereotypes Prevent
Women's Ascent up the Organizational Ladder, 57 J. Soc. IssuEs 657, 658-60 (2001) (discussing
descriptive gender stereotypes as those that ascribe certain traits to women and men, and the
attendant expectations that women, as a result of such stereotypes, will, for example, produce an
inferior work product to those of men); see also Diana Burgess & Eugene Borgida, Who Women Are,
Who Women Should Be: Descriptive and Prescriptive Gender Stereotyping in Sex Discrimination, 5
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prioritize work, or are unreliable,5 may contribute to the defeat of
accommodation laws that Smith advocates. Certainly, these stereotypes
have undermined caregiver-friendly policies such as telecommuting orflex-time."
An examination of the current body of social science research
reveals that unlawful gender discrimination in the workplace is driven by
erroneous assumptions based upon caregiver status." It is particularly
important to understand stereotypes about caregivers, and mothers
especially, because stereotypes about a group affect the behavior of
those who interact with members of that group." This is because
behavior is determined by intention, which is a function of attitude
towards both that behavior and the subject of that behavior. 9 It follows,
therefore, that if an employer entertains certain stereotypes about
mothers and/or caregivers, that employer will likely treat her
mother/caregiver employees differently from how it may treat other
employees.
Several stereotypes associated with mothers (married mothers,
stepmothers, divorced mothers, and never-married mothers) reported by
Ganong and Coleman support the assertion that caregivers face
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 665, 665-92 (1999) (reviewing research literature involving descriptive and
prescriptive gender stereotypes and discussing how these types of stereotypes emerge in sex
discrimination and sexual harassment litigation).
55. Faye J. Crosby, Joan C. Williams & Monica Biernat, The Maternal Wall, 60 J. Soc. ISSUES 675,
675-82 (2004) (discussing the influence of stereotypic thinking on behavior and the wage gap between
mothers and non-mothers); Francine M. Deutsch & Susan E. Saxon, The Double Standard of Praise
and Criticism for Mothers and Fathers, 22 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 665, 665-83 (1998) (finding that
mothers reported receiving criticism more than did fathers for too little involvement at home or too
much involvement in paid work); Lawrence H. Ganong & Marilyn Coleman, The Content of Mother
Stereotypes, 32 SEx ROLES 495, 495-52 (1995) (identifying and reporting the content of stereotypes
related to married mothers, stepmothers, divorced mothers, and never married mothers and as
juxtaposed against the attribution of those traits to women in general).
56. See Joan Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, Family Responsibilities Discrimination and
Developments in the Role of Stereotyping and Implicit Bias Evidence, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1311, 1329-30
(noting that, "[niot surprisingly, researchers have found that women who use family-friendly policies
at work encounter stigma that leads to lower wage rates and documented a heavy stigma associated
with the use of flexible schedules," (citing Jennifer Glass, Blessing or Curse? Work-Family Policies
and Mother's Wage Growth Over Time, 31 WORK & OCCUP'S 367 (2004))(footnotes omitted); CYNTHIA
FUCHS EPSTEIN ET AL., THE PART-TIME PARADOX: TIME NORMS, PROFESSIONAL LIFE, FAMILY AND GENDER
(1999); JOAN C. WILLIAMS & CYNTHIA THOMAS CALVERT, BETTER ON BALANCE? THE CORPORATE
COUNSEL WORK/LIFE REPORT (The Project for Attorney Retention, Corporate Counsel Project, Final
Report 2003), available at http://www.uchastings.edu/ site_files/WLL/betteronbalance.pdf; JOAN C.
WILLIAMS & CYNTHIA THOMAS CALVERT, BALANCED HOURS: EFFECTIVE PART-TIME POLICIES FOR
WASHINGTON LAW FIRMS (The Project for Attorney Retention, Final Report 2d ed. 2001), available at
http://www.uchastings.edu/site-files/WLL/ BalancedHourS2nd.pdf).
57. See Cuddy et al., supra note 52; Fuegen et al., supra note 44.
58. See, e.g., M. Snyder & W. Swann, Behavioral Confirmation in Social Interaction: From Social
Perception to Social Interaction, 14 J. EXPMT'L Soc. PSYCHOL. 148, 148-62 (1978).
59. Icek Ajzen & Martin Fishbein, The Influence of Attitudes on Behaviors, in THE HANDBOOK OF
ATTITUDES 173, 193 (Dolores Albarracfn et al. eds., 2005).
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significant and "erroneous" discrimination in employment. 6 Ganong and
Coleman found that for mother-associated "positive" traits such as
reliability, independent decision making, stability, competition, and
trustworthiness, study participants scored never married mothers,
divorced mothers and stepmothers significantly lower than they did
women in general. Participants rated all types of mothers below women
in general for the trait of intelligence. For negative traits such as
irresponsibility, laziness, stupidity, lack of ambition, low achievement,
drug use, "a loser," and bitterness, unmarried mothers were rated
significantly higher than all other mother types and women in general.
6
,
Participants also attributed the trait of mistake making to both married
mothers and never-married mothers at a significantly higher rate than
they did to women in general (for stepmothers and divorced mothers the
percentage of attribution was the same-74%). 6 Additionally, a higher
percentage of participants attributed the trait of "willing to give up
career" to married mothers and never married mothers than they did to
women in general.65
Ganong and Coleman's study demonstrates that for the above-
mentioned stereotypical traits (and others not listed here), mothers are
viewed either less positively, or more negatively, than nonmothers.
Additionally, these characteristics are certainly ones of importance in the
employment context. Presumably, most employers value traits such as
responsibility, competition, and independent decision making.
Employers especially value the trait of intelligence. Yet, according to
Ganong and Coleman's findings, mothers are less frequently attributed
these characteristics than are women without children. These gender-
based stereotypes translate into discriminatory assumptions about
parents that can manifest themselves in the workplace.
Fuegen and her colleagues' 2004 findings demonstrate such a
translation.?6 In their study, 196 participants evaluated a job applicant
who was either male or female and either single or married with two
children. 6 Both parental status and the gender of the applicant affected
the participants' judgments about the applicant.?' Participants regarded
parents as less committed and less available on the job than nonparents. 69
Additionally, male job applicants with children were held to lower
6o. Ganong & Coleman, supra note 55.
61. Id. at 502-05.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Fuegen et al., supra note 44.
67. Id. at 741.
68. Id. at 744-48.
69. Id.
[Vol. 59:1463
June 2008] LEGISLATING CAREGIVER DISCRIMINATION
performance and time commitment standards than were male job
applicants without children.7" In contrast, female job applicants with
children were held to higher standards for performance and time
commitment than were female job applicants without children."
Cuddy and her colleagues' 2004 study on perceptions of competence
in working mothers further illustrates the kind of discrimination
caregivers face in employment.72  Cuddy analyzed the reported
perceptions of 122 study participants and found that working women
who became mothers were perceived as less competent than they were
before motherhood.73 Additionally, participants reported less interest in
promoting, hiring and educating mother employees compared to women
employees without children.74 As expected, participants also reported a
greater interest in promoting, hiring, and educating employees or
applicants that they perceived as competent. 5 The authors concluded
that the loss in perceived competence harmed female employees who
became mothers when employers made decisions concerning hiring,
promotion, and education of these employees.
76
This recent research indicates that-contrary to Professor Smith's
presumptions about stereotyping-parents, especially mothers, suffer
due to discriminatory attitudes at work on the basis of their family
responsibilities. Additionally, research regarding the work productivity
of parents, in particular parents who are afforded flexible working
conditions, indicates that this discrimination is, in fact, based on
erroneous assumptions about the commitment of parent workers,
notwithstanding alternative working arrangements.
The research firmly establishes that motherhood is a key trigger for
gender stereotyping7" While less research has been done about
stereotyping of male caregivers, some studies have reported that
employers find men who want to take parental leave to be unreasonable
79
and that men who work part-time are viewed negatively and seen as
unable to fill their traditional obligations as primary breadwinners.
8
,
The tale of this stereotyping research is startling. If not properly
understood by advocates, judges, or jurors, the impact could be
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Cuddy et al., supra note 52.
73. Id. at 701.
74. Id. at7oi,711.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 714-15.
77. Williams & Bornstein, supra note 56 at 1322.
78. Id.
79. Martin Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave Revisited, i99 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 25, 39-43 (1998).
8o. See generally Alice Eagly & Valerie Steffen, Gender Stereotypes, Occupational Roles, and
Beliefs About Part-Time Employees, 1O PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 252 (1986).
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disastrous for FRD cases. At least one court specifically cited to
Professor Smith's article's minimization of stereotyping as grounds to
deny relief to a woman who was fired while on maternity leave.8 In
Ackerman v. Quilcene School District, Quilcene School District failed to
reinstate Kristy Ackerman to her custodial position after she took
maternity leave.2 She brought a wrongful discharge claim, asserting
discrimination on the basis of her family status8s The court ultimately
refused to find an exception to the doctrine of employment at will due to
familial obligations to children."s Quoting Professor Smith, the court
stated: "When compared with the data regarding racial and gender
discrimination, the evidence does not exist to indicate that employment
discrimination against parents based on erroneous assumptions is a
serious problem."
' 85
Acknowledgment by some courts since Professor Smith's article of
the role of stereotyping in FRD cases has made these cases easier to
prove in some jurisdictions, specifically in terms of who to compare the
86discriminated caregiver against. In recognizing gender stereotyping in
FRD, Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free School Districts' also
resolved a concern raised by Professor Smith about the difficulty of
finding a suitable comparator in FRD cases0 The Second Circuit held
that a plaintiff can prove a disparate treatment case under Title VII with
gender stereotyping evidence, without having to point to a similarly
situated member of an unprotected group who was treated better than
the plaintiff."9
In May 2007, the EEOC followed this landmark development with
an important recognition of the special features of FRD cases when it
issued the EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Unlawful Disparate Treatment
of Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities.' This Enforcement
Guidance not only affirms the role of stereotyping in FRD cases
questioned by Professor Smith, it addresses the concerns about finding
appropriate comparators by confirming that employment decisions that
discriminate against workers with caregiving responsibilities are
81. Ackerman v. Quilcene Sch. Dist., No. 29300-5-II, 2003 Wash. App. LEXIS 1711, at *5 (Wash.
Ct. App. July 29, 2003).
82. Id.
83. Id. at *8-9.
84. Id. at *22.
85. Id. at *22 n.12.
86. See, e.g., Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 1o7, 121-23 (2d Cir.
2004); Lust v. Sealy, 243 F. Supp. 2d 908, 9i i-i9 (W.D. Wis. 2003).
87. 365 F.3d at 121-23.
88. Smith, Parental-Status, supra note 8, at 589-91.
89. Back, 365 F.3d at 121-23.
9o. EEOC Guidance, supra note 6, at §§ I-III.
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prohibited by Title VII, even in the absence of comparators.9 The
Enforcement Guidance also settles Professor Smith's concern that a
flood of FRD cases under an alternative parental status theory will
unduly burden the EEOC.92 The Enforcement Guidance demonstrates
the EEOC's commitment to combating discrimination against caregivers
in the workplace.
As more research on parent stereotypes in employment emerges, a
clearer picture of this discrimination will continue to develop. As of now,
however, the research strongly indicates that employees with family
responsibilities suffer discrimination regarding their competence and
expectations for job performance. A statute prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of family responsibilities is needed to help caregivers combat
these obstacles.
III. ACCOMMODATIONS ARE NOT ENOUGH TO COMBAT FRD
Professor Smith argues that work/life conflicts that typically confront
employees are less a matter of intentional conduct based on prejudice
and stereotypes and more a matter of structural barriers in which care-
giving responsibilities/issues clash with job demands.93 Professor Smith's
article proposes that the better solution for addressing work/life conflicts
is to reformulate workplace structures and norms through
accommodation laws and leave statutes.94
Focusing exclusively on the strengthening of accommodations laws
to combat FRD is problematic in many respects. Joan Williams and
Stephanie Bornstein articulated several shortcomings of the
accommodation focus in their article Caregivers in the Courtroom: The
Growing Trend of Family Responsibilities Discrimination.95 The most
obvious shortcoming of framing an FRD case in terms of a caregiver's
need for accommodation at work is that it precludes reliance on Title
VII, as it does not require employers to accommodate a caregiver's
special needs. 96 Courts have also been reluctant to insist that employers
provide accommodation in cases brought under the ADA based on the
assumption that accommodation will be expensive for employers.97
91. Id. at § II.A.2 ("Employment decisions that discriminate against workers with caregiving
responsibilities are prohibited by Title VII if they are based on sex or another protected characteristic,
regardless of whether the employer discriminates more broadly against all members of the protected
class. For example, sex discrimination against working mothers is prohibited by Title VII even if the
employer does not discriminate against childless women.").
92. See Smith, Parental-Status, supra note 8, at 61 i.
93. Id. at 594-95.
94. Id. at 595.
95. Joan Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, Caregivers in the Courtroom: The Growing Trend of
Family Responsibilities Discrimination, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 171, 173 (2006).
96. Id.; see also Williams & Bornstein, supra note 56, at 1322.
97. Williams & Bornstein, supra note 95.
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Moreover, framing change in terms of accommodation lends credence to
the concept of an ideal worker "as someone who works full-time, year-
round for years on end, without career interruptions, and with no
domestic or childcare responsibilities., 98 As Williams and Bornstein note:
"Changing this norm is not asking for special treatment; it is eliminating
discrimination. " 99
Professor Smith's preference for strengthening accommodation laws
in lieu of FRD legislation as a strategy to combat FRD presumes that all
employees who also happen to have caregiving responsibilities need or
want workplace accommodations. Many do not. The danger in
overstating the need for workplace accommodations is the perpetuation
of the stereotype that all parents and other family caregivers will likely
need them. Moreover, the accommodation strategy does not address the
actual cause of many adverse employment actions against employees
who are perceived to be caregivers -negative stereotyping that creates
false presumptions about a worker's dedication to the job. This is the gap
filled by FRD legislation expressly prohibiting caregiver discrimination.
Many FRD cases decided since Professor Smith published her article
involve adverse employment actions motivated by discriminatory
attitudes, not accommodation disputes. For example, in Lettieri v.
Equant Inc., a female executive alleged that her employer violated Title
VII when it terminated her following a refusal to promote her."'° She
contended that while being interviewed for a promotion that required
weekly travel between New York and Virginia, her employer asked how
her husband handled her being away from home so much, "not caring for
the family."'' The supervisor also told Lettieri that he "had a very
difficult time understanding why any man would allow his wife to live
away from home during the week ..... The Fourth Circuit reversed the
district court's order granting summary judgment, finding that a jury
could find that the employer had a discriminatory attitude.' °3
Similarly, in Lust v. Sealy, Inc., the plaintiff brought suit for
discrimination under Title VII, where her employer admitted that he did
not consider her for a promotion which required relocation to another
city based on the assumption that, because she had children, she would
not want to relocate. 4 Lust, who had been a successful salesperson,
never told the employer that she would not relocate, and repeatedly
98. Id. at 173-74.
99. Id. at 174.
100. 478 F.3d 64o, 643 (4th Cir. 2007).
ioi. Id. at 643.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 649.
104. 243 F. Supp. 2d 908,9i3 (W.D. Wis. 2003).
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affirmed her desire for a promotion." The court agreed that the
employer's actions constituted unlawful sex discrimination., Here, Lust
was not seeking an accommodation because she had children. Rather,
the adverse employment action was driven by stereotypical assumptions
about what a mother would and would not do for a promotion. These
cases and others demonstrate that when discrimination is driven by bias,
stronger accommodation laws do not provide a remedy.'"
Antidiscrimination and accommodation statutes need not be
mutually exclusive. In many cases, a strengthening of accommodation
laws and antidiscrimination laws working in tandem could have yielded
the best results. For example, in Philipsen v. University of Michigan,
Heidi Philipsen applied for, and was tentatively offered, an assistant
director position at the University's business school.' 8 However, before
the offer, her employer asked her if she was sure that she wanted the job,
and whether she was sure that she would not rather stay at home with
her children." After she assured the employer that she did want the job,
she was offered the position."' When she merely inquired about the
possibility of flextime in the new position, she was immediately
terminated on the grounds that her question was "disrespectful" and
demonstrated that she was not committed to the job."' Philipsen was
fired for inquiring about workplace accommodations, not because she
insisted upon any. Clearly, stereotypical assumptions about her
105. Id. at 952.
io6. Id. at 99.
107. See Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., i6 F.3 d 340, 341 (8th Cir. 1997) (plaintiff demoted to a
position that defendant employer claimed would be more appropriate "for a new mom to handle");
Philipsen v. Univ. of Mich., No. O6-cv-iI977-DT, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25898, at *8-I, (E.D. Mich.
Mar. 22, 2007) (defendant employer asked whether plaintiff would rather stay home with her children
before offering her the job, and then rescinded an offer of employment because it questioned
plaintiff's commitment to the job after she merely inquired about a flex-time work schedule): Hess-
Watson v. Potter, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53, at *5 (E.D. W. Va. 2004) (plaintiff employee alleged that
defendant employer gave mothers of young children undesirable work positions); Wensel v. State
Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 218 F. Supp. 2d io47, io6i (N.D. Iowa 2002) (plaintiff constructively
discharged in her third trimester of pregnancy after supervisor commented that child rearing adversely
impacted worker productivity); Salvatore v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, No. 98 Civ. 2450, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15551, at *29-30 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, I999) (finding that comments by supervisor to
plaintiff employee that women with children should stay at home, and suggesting that plaintiff
employee derived sexual gratification from breast-feeding her child did not amount to actionable
sexual harassment because it was unrelated to plaintiff's gender); Ackerman v. Quilcene Sch. Dist.,
No. 29300-5-II, 2003 Wash. App. LEXIS 1711, at *6 (Wash. Ct. App. July 29, 2003) (plaintiff laid off
while on maternity leave, while other employees without children remained employed; her employer
assured her that it would be a "win-win situation" to stay at home with her babies and collect
unemployment).
io8. Philipsen v. Univ. of Mich., No. o6-CV-iI 9 7 7 -DT, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25898, at *7 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 22, 2007).
io9. Id. at *7-8.
iio. Id.
iii. Id. at *9-IO.
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commitment to work as a mother were a motivating factor in the
termination. Rendering its decision just months before the EEOC's
Enforcement Guidance confirmed that a Title VII claim could be proven
without a comparator on stereotyping evidence alone, the Eastern
District Court in Michigan denied Philipsen's discrimination claim
because she could not identify similarly situated men to serve as
comparator employees in her position."2 Working in tandem with
stronger accommodation laws that allowed for flextime in the workplace,
a statute expressly prohibiting caregiver discrimination would have
provided a strong alternative basis of Philipsen's claim.
Similarly, in Hess-Watson v. Potter, a United States District Court of
Virginia considered the discrimination claim of Robin Hess-Watson, a
postal worker whose employment location was closed while she was on
maternity leave." 3 Though Hess-Watson was eligible for reassignment to
another facility, her employer refused to assign her a shift that was
comparable to her previous position and instead offered her a position
that interfered with her childcare obligations."4 She alleged that her
employer discriminated against mothers with young children by offering
them less favorable employment positions at the new facility."' Being as
the court decided the issue before the EEOC issued its recent
Enforcement Guidance, the court denied her "sex-plus" Title VII claim,
noting that there were no similarly situated males to serve as
comparators.' Hess-Watson suffered not only from the employer's
refusal to accommodate her, but also from the disparate impact of a
discriminatory assignment of less favorable shifts to working mothers.
Finally, laws prohibiting discrimination based on an individual's
perceived caregiving responsibilities produce a more supportive work
environment for those employees who may also need workplace
accommodations. From the mere existence of an antidiscrimination
statute, the court inferred an employer's obligation to provide workplace
accommodations in Simpson v. District of Columbia Office of Human
Rights."' Charlotte Simpson was discharged from her job after she
refused to accept a new shift beginning one-and-a-half hours earlier than
I12. Id. at *27. The Court specifically noted:
To allow Plaintiff to argue that Defendant discriminated against her as compared to women
without young children would turn this gender discrimination case into a parental
discrimination case. Instead, the court agrees with Defendant that "gender-plus plaintiffs
can never be successful if there is no corresponding subclass of members of the opposite
gender."
Id.
113. No. 7:03cvoo389, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53, at *2-4 (W.D. Va. Jan. 5, 2004).
114. Id. at *4.
I15. Id. at *5.
i 16. Id. at *7.
117. 597 A.2d 392, 394 (D.C. 199i).
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her original shift, because the new shift would have prevented her from
helping her elderly and disabled father who lived with her prepare for
the day."8 The D.C. Court, noting that the D.C. Human Rights Act
("DCHRA") protected employees against discrimination on the basis of
family responsibilities,"9 held that the D.C. Office of Human Rights
(DCOHR) had a duty to determine whether Simpson's employer needed
to provide her with reasonable accommodations relating to her family
responsibilities.2 ' The DCHRA is silent on whether it creates an explicit
requirement for an employer to accommodate an employee's work
schedule based on that employee's family responsibilities.'2' However,
the court found that the statute's FRD protections, combined with the
fact that a similar statute, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,122 prohibited
discrimination as well as mandated reasonable accommodations for
disabled employees, left open the possibility that such a requirement
existed under DCHRA as well.'23 Simpson illustrates that the existence of
an antidiscrimination law can provide a strong policy basis for more
rigorous enforcement of workplace accommodation laws.
IV. FRD LEGISLATION IS AN APPROPRIATE EXTENSION OF
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
Professor Smith argues that legislation prohibiting employment
discrimination based on parental status is an inappropriate extension of
the "anti-discrimination" doctrine because parents are not a group in
need of heightened judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.'24
However, a close examination of Equal Protection jurisprudence reveals
that Professor Smith relies on an outdated and improper analysis that is
not determinative of whether statutory employment protection should
extend to a wide variety of social groups, including those identified by
gender, sexual orientation, age, and others.
Professor Smith contends that legislative decisions to protect
particular groups from employment discrimination "occasionally" hinge
on a list of factors comparable to the criteria used by courts to determine
which classifications require heightened judicial scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause.'25 Those factors include (I) the possession of an
immutable characteristic by members of the protected class, (2) the
existence of a history of discrimination against members of the class, (3)
iiS. Id.
1i9. Id. at 404.
120. Id. at 405-o6.
121. Id. at 405.
122. 29 U.S.C. §§ 70i-796 (2005).
123. Simpson, 597 A.2d at 405-06.
124. Smith, Parental-Status, supra note 8, at 600-02.
125. Id. at 6oi.
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the relevance of the characteristic to legitimate decision making, and (4)
the political power of the class.,
6
However, these Equal Protection factors, also known as the
Carolene Products formula,'27 do not constitute a precise formula for
determining if and when a certain social group qualifies as a suspect
class.' A number of scholars have suggested that the Carolene Products
analysis is a bankrupt standard, rooted in an unrealistic model of politics,
that the Court itself no longer uses in a substantive manner.'29 Bruce
Ackerman has called for a "reorientation" of the doctrine in the interest
of protecting against discrimination within a pluralistic democracy.3'
The implicit narrative of the Carolene Products analysis is race.'3 ' As
it currently stands, the only laws subjected to strict scrutiny under the
Court's antidiscrimination analysis have been those involving racial
classifications.'32 Yet the Court did not necessarily employ each, if any,
Carolene Products factor in its analysis in all of these cases.'33 Nor has
126. Id. (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 16-23 (3d ed. 2000)); see also
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215 (I944).
127. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); Bruce A. Ackerman,
Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 718 (1985) (explaining that the four operative terms
of Carolene Products are "(I) prejudice, (2) discrete, (3) insular, and (4) minorities").
128. See Thomas W. Simon, Suspect Class Democracy: A Social Theory, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 107,
155 (i990) ("Individual factors... do not provide a precise formula for clearly determining if and
when a social group qualifies as a suspect class. Instead, the factors, along with the mitigating concerns,
interrelate. The case or narrative for suspect class status must be constructed from the sum of these
factors.").
Y29. See Ackerman, supra note 127, at 717-18, 723-24; Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection
Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 966-67 (describing the results of applying the Carolene Products
factors as a "messy hodgepodge").
130. See Ackerman, supra note 127, at 718.
131. Id. at 715; see also Winston P. Nagan, Dean Kronman's Diversity Narrative: Liberal Education
Ideology Versus Social Justice?, 52 FLA. L. REv. 897, 912 (2000) (suggesting that social justice
advancements achieved by "white women" and "hispanics" via the Carolene Products analysis is based
on the discrimination experienced by African Americans, and that "[t]hese complex claims to social
justice ... are structured around a legal drama whose parameters are defined by the Carolene Products
footnote" (italics added)).
132. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326-27 (2003) (applying strict scrutiny to racially
based public law school admissions process); Adarand Constr. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 222-26 (995)
(applying strict scrutiny to racial classification in federal government contract law); City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 49o-5ii (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to racial classification in city
contract law); Univ. of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290-91 (1978) (applying strict scrutiny to
racial classification in state university admissions procedure); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 765-68
(1977) (declining to apply strict scrutiny to classifications based on illegitimacy, applying intermediate
scrutiny instead); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215 (I944) (applying strict scrutiny to
racially-based internment camp legislation); Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote Four: A History of
the Carolene Products Footnote, 46 S. TEx. L. REV. 163, 215-17 (2004); Michael A. Scaperlanda,
Illusions of Liberty and Equality: An "Alien's" View of Tiered Scrutiny, Ad Hoc Balancing,
Governmental Power, and Judicial Imperialism, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 5, 22 (2005); Simon, supra note
128, at 132.
133. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (applying strict scrutiny to an affirmative action program but not
employing the "discrete and insular minority" factors in their analysis); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I
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strict scrutiny been necessary to invalidate laws that violate equal
protection.'34 Furthermore, the Court has not employed this analysis to
determine whether a social group deserves legislative protection against
discrimination. Rather, the Court uses it to determine what level of
scrutiny (strict, intermediate, or rational basis review) is appropriate to
apply when they decide whether or not to invalidate legislation that
arguably discriminates against a certain social group.'35
Under the Court's tiered equal protection review, gender constitutes
only a quasi-suspect class, and gender classifications are subject only to
intermediate scrutiny.'36 This fact, however, does not preclude specific
statutory protections against gender discrimination under Title VII, or
even against retaliation under FMLA.'37 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has noted that, while it currently recognizes certain classifications
as suspect, or quasi-suspect (e.g. race and gender), this list is not
exhaustive.' 38
Even if one measures the appropriateness of FRD legislation using
the four factors of this outdated and inapplicable analysis, a case in favor
of such legislation can be made. Professor Smith agrees that immutability
is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for a characteristic to merit
inclusion in antidiscrimination statutes, noting protection afforded under
state and federal laws on the basis of religion, age, and marital status,
which are not immutable characteristics.' 9 With respect to historic
discrimination, Professor Smith argues that parents have not been the
subject of historic discrimination, while curiously conceding that women
as a group have.'4 Abundant literature establishes that maternal wall
stereotyping is probably the most open and blatant form of gender bias
(1967) (striking down anti-segregation laws on Equal Protection grounds but making no mention of
Carolene Products).
134. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442-43, 450 (1985) (striking down
a local ordinance discriminating against the developmentally disabled despite declining to accord the
disabled suspect class status); Trimble, 430 U.S. at 765-68 (striking down legislation discriminating on
the basis of illegitimacy, despite declining to apply strict scrutiny).
135. See, e.g., City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442-43; Trimble, 430 U.S. at 765-68; Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976); Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
136. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 6o-6i (2001); United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531-34 (1996); J. E. B. v. Ala. ex rel. T. B., 511 U.S. 127, 135 (1994);
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1982); Michael M. v. Superior Court,
Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 468-69 (1981); Orr v. Off, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (979); Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Craig, 429 U.S. at 197-98; Mark Strasser, Statutory Construction, Equal
Protection, and the Amendment Process: On Romer, Hunter, and Efforts to Tame Baehr, 45 BUFF. L.
REv. 739 (1997).
137. See, e.g., Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721,728-29, 735 (2003).
138. See Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 320 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("It
cannot be gainsaid that there remain ... classes, not now classified as 'suspect,' that are unfairly
burdened by invidious discrimination unrelated to the individual worth of their members . .
139. Smith, Parental-Status, supra note 8, at 602-03.
140. Id. at 605-o6.
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today.' 4' Professor Smith's assertion that "parental status correlates with
job performance far more strongly than do other attributes that are
subject to employment antidiscrimination legislation"'42 has been
similarly debunked by ample stereotyping research.' 43 Finally, Professor
Smith's conclusion that parents have not been traditionally excluded
from political and economic power"4 ignores both historical and
continuing disenfranchisement of working mothers from economic and
political power. 
4
1
While the case may be made that caregiver status satisfies the Equal
Protection analysis, reliance on these factors to determine the legitimacy
of FRD is not advisable, especially in light of the questionable-if not
defunct -status of the Carolene Products formula as guiding language in
antidiscrimination analysis. Professor Smith's doctrinal approach has had
adverse impacts for at least one FRD case brought in Washington."6 In
Ackerman v. Quilcene School District, the Washington Court of Appeals
rejected a strong FRD claim by a mother who was laid off while on
maternity leave.'47 There, the court relied on Professor Smith's
conclusion that "[a]rguments to prohibit employers from discriminating
against parents run counter to traditional antidiscrimination employment
measures."'4s
The legitimacy of FRD protection is better measured by comparing
caregivers as a social group to other social groups that have received
statutory protection against discrimination and other unfair labor
conditions. These groups include many that would not pass muster under
the four factors the Court looks at in determining what constitutes a
suspect classification subject to strict scrutiny, including those over forty
years old protected by the Age Discrimination Equality Act, and
children, who have been afforded protection under child labor laws.'49
Similarly, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is prohibited
under the civil rights statutes of California and other states.' ° Pregnant
141. See generally Crosby, Williams & Biernat, supra note 55, at 675-82.
142. Smith, Parental-Status, supra note 8, at 609.
143. See discussion infra Part II and accompanying notes.
144. Smith, Parental-Status, supra note 8, at 6IO.
145. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLIcT AND WHAT TO Do
ABOUT IT 1 (2000) (discussing how, in a system of domesticity, caregivers are marginalized socially and
economically: "Caregivers often cannot perform as ideal workers. Their inability to do so gives rise to
domesticity's second defining characteristic: its system of providing for caregiving by marginalizing the
caregivers, thereby cutting them off from most of the social roles that offer responsibility and
authority....").
146. Ackerman v. Quilcene Sch. Dist., No. 29300-5-11, 2003 Wash. App. LEXIS 17ii, at *6 (Wash.
Ct. App. July 29, 2003).
147. Id. at *2-5, *33-34.
148. Id. at 22 n.12.
149. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006).
15o. See, e.g., California Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12940-12591
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women are protected under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
("PDA"). I'5 Persons with disabilities are protected under the Americans
with Disabilities Act.'52 In fact, some status-protection statutes have been
passed, in part, as a response to the Supreme Court refusing to extend
status protection to certain groups. An example of this includes the
PDA, which was passed after the Court failed to extend Title VII gender
discrimination protection to pregnant women in General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert."3 The legislature is entitled to pass protective laws regardless of
whether the Constitution demands those protections, so long as such
laws do not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."4
Legislation that expressly prohibits discrimination based on family
caregiver status or duties is an appropriate extension of this protective
legislative tradition. FRD legislation, like other civil rights legislation,
plays an important role in changing social norms in the workplace.'
Laws expressly prohibiting discrimination against caregivers confirm that
the role of caregivers is valued in this society, and that workers can be
committed workers and family caregivers. This normative effect
strengthens the capacity of other laws, such as FAMLA and the ADA, to
protect employees' rights.' Furthermore, FRD legislation is designed to
ensure that employment decisions are based on work performance, not
false presumptions about caregivers. As such, the legislation serves a role
(2008).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006); see Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (denying Title
VII protection to pregnant women as a class using Equal Protection analysis).
152. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, 47 U.S.C § 225 (2006); see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442-43 (1985) (denying suspect class status to the mentally challenged).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 200oe(k); see Gen. Elec., 429 U.S. 125; see also Andrew Weissmann, Sexual
Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 690, 691 (1983) (noting that
Congress passed the PDA in response to Gilbert).
154. Ultimately, suspect classification, and its accompanying scrutiny under the Fourteenth
Amendment, may be undesirable for caregivers if adequate accommodation laws are to be passed for
their benefit. Using strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court has invalidated a host of affirmative action
programs designed to benefit job or education applicants on the basis of race. See Parents Involved in
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. i, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2768 (2o07) (holding that school district's
program designed to effectuate racial balance in public schools denied students equal protection by
classifying students by race); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 276 (2003) (holding that admissions
policy taking applicants' race into account violated the Equal Protection Clause); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 238-39 (1995) (invalidating federal government's policy of
presumptive preference for minority businesses in awarding government contracts); City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 510-11 (1989) (invalidating, under strict scrutiny analysis, a city council
plan to award a certain percentage of city contracts to minority-owned businesses). A suspect class
designation for caregivers could prevent accommodations much as it has prevented affirmative action
accommodations on the basis of race in educational and employment settings.
155. For a comprehensive analysis of the role of law in creating institutional change, see supra note
5 and accompanying text; see also WILLIAMS & CALVERT, supra note 4.
I56. Simpson v. D.C. Office of Human Rights, 597 A.2d 392,394 (D.C. i99I).
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in ensuring fundamental fairness to a group in need of, and worthy of,
protection.
V. FRD LEGISLATION'S PUBLIC POLICY ROLE IN LITIGATION COMBATING
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CAREGIVERS
The contribution of FRD legislation to the successful litigation of
FRD in the courts cannot be understated. In addition to providing a
statutory claim, FRD legislation creates public policy on which to base a
variety of tort claims challenging discrimination against caregivers.
In the District of Columbia, courts have relied on the DCHRA to
recognize a public policy exception to the "employment-at-will" doctrine
for employees terminated based on their caregiver status.' In MacNabb
v. MacCartee, Mary MacNabb was terminated without notice after she
suffered prolonged harassment by her supervisor regarding her
pregnancy, including the suggestion that she have an abortion.' She
alleged the termination violated a number of laws, including the
DCHRA, which prohibits employment discrimination based on family
responsibilities.' In denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court
recognized that under the DCHRA, FRD in employment is recognized
as a public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.'6 In
doing so, the court noted that MacNabb was not asking the court to fill a
gap in the DCHRA; the legislature expressly prohibited FRD under the
law.' 6'
While the District of Columbia provides a stellar example of the
effectiveness of FRD statutes in providing a legislative strategy to
combat FRD, few jurisdictions have followed suit. Some jurisdictions
that do not have statutes expressly prohibiting FRD, such as Virginia,
have permitted public policy claims based on gender discrimination. 
6
,
However, many courts have refused public policy claims without a public
policy against discrimination based on caregiver responsibilities or
familial status explicitly articulated in state law.66 For example, in Upton
157. See MacNabb v. MacCartee, 804 F. Supp. 378,381 (D.D.C. I992).
158. Id. at 379.
159. Id. at 379, 381.
i6o. Id. at 38o-8i.
i61. Id. at 380.
162. In Bailey v. Schott Gallaher, 480 S.E.2d 502 (Va. 1997), the Virginia Supreme Court allowed a
female employee who had been fired after having a baby to pursue a wrongful termination claim
premised on the claim that her termination constituted gender discrimination and therefore violated
Virginia's public policy. Id. at 505 .
163. See, e.g., Rivera v. Cherry Hill Convalescent Ctr., No. 04-2449, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30117
(D.N.J. May 17, 2006) (employer that fired an at-will employee for missing a shift due to child care
responsibilities did not violate the public policy underlying New Jersey's child neglect laws); Lloyd v.
AMF Bowling Ctrs., 985 P.2d 629 (Ariz. 1999) (citing Upton v. JWP Businessland, 682 N.E.2d 1357
(Mass. 1997), in holding that defendant employer did not violate public policy in firing an employee
who could not report to work unexpectedly due to child care duties); Upton, 682 N.E.2d 1357 (finding
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v. .JWP Businessland,'64 the Massachusetts Supreme Court considered
whether or not the wrongful termination of Upton-a single parent who
could not comply with newly imposed long work hours because of
caregiving duties-was a violation of public policy.' In dismissing
Upton's claim, the court found that -no public purpose is served by the
conduct for which the plaintiff asserts she was discharged," and that
Massachusetts' broad policy of protecting the family unit and care of
children did not transform the discharge of such an at-will employee into
a discharge as against a "well-defined public policy.' ' 66 The court went on
to note that while the state legislature may have passed laws providing
unemployment compensation for such employees, it had "not provided
that such an employee has an action for wrongful discharge. '' 6, While the
court expressed its sympathy for the challenge of reconciling parental
responsibilities with work responsibilities, it concluded that "employer
liability under common-law principles is not an appropriate means of
addressing the problem in the at-will context.
'
'
68
The Arizona Supreme Court considered the same issue two years
later in Lloyd v. AMF Bowling Centers.'6 In that case, Gary Lloyd was
fired after failing to meet his employer's demand that he work
unexpectedly on a Saturday.'70 Lloyd informed his employer that he
could not secure an alternative caregiver for his four-year-old that day,
and thus could not work. 7' Lloyd brought suit under the theory of
wrongful termination in violation of public policy."' He argued that
capitulating to the demands of his employer would have caused him to
commit criminal neglect with respect to his son.'73 The court dismissed
Lloyd's claim, finding that because the act required by AMF Bowling (to
report for work) was lawful and permissible under the terms of Lloyd's
employment, Lloyd had no claim, under Arizona common law, for
that Massachusetts' broad policies of protecting the family unit did not transform the discharge of an
employee who could not work particular hours into a discharge in violation of public policy); Hampton
v. Armand, 834 A.2d 1077 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (finding that FMLA does not support a
public policy against terminating employees for taking leave when they have been employed for less
than twelve months); Hundley v. Dayton Power & Light, 774 N.E.2d 330 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002)
(finding that Ohio had no clear public policy against terminating an employee for requesting leave to
care for injured relatives); Ackerman v. Quilcene Sch. Dist., No. 29300-5-II, 2003 Wash. App. LEXIS
1711 (Wash. Ct. App. July 29, 2003) (dismissing an employee's wrongful discharge claim because
Washington had no clear public policy against family status discrimination in employment).
164. 682 N.E.2d I357.
165. Id. at 1358.
166. Id. at 1359.
167. Id. at 1360.
68. Id. at 1362.
169. 985 P.2d 629 (Ariz. 1999).
170. Id. at 630.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 63o-3 i .
173. Id. at 631.
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wrongful termination.'74 Additionally, the court cited and applied Upton
for the proposition that to recognize a public policy exception to the at-
will doctrine for employees in Upton and Lloyd's situations would
convert the doctrine of at-will termination into "a rule that requires just
cause to terminate an at-will employee."'75 Finally, the court declined to
recognize any public policy that would prevent employers from
summoning employees unexpectedly and then firing them if they did not
comply, thereby focusing the public policy inquiry on the act required by
the employer rather than on the employee's reasons for not complying
with such a requirement.'
In Rivera v. Cherry Hill Convalescent Center, the New Jersey District
Court considered whether a discharge related to family responsibilities
violated the public polices underlying New Jersey's Civil Defense and
Disaster Control Act ("CDDCA") and child neglect laws.'77 Zoraida
Rivera was forced to leave a work shift when her son's school was closed
due to a state of emergency and she could not find a babysitter"' She
was subsequently fired for violating Cherry Hill Convalescent Center's
absenteeism policy, with her employer noting that her excuse for missing
work was unacceptable.'79 Rivera brought a wrongful termination claim,
arguing that because she would have violated child neglect laws during a
state of emergency by leaving her son home alone while she worked, her
discharge violated public policies implicit in both the CDDCA and child
neglect laws.'"° In granting Cherry Hill Convalescent Center's motion for
summary judgment, the New Jersey District Court held that no clearly
mandated public policy P rohibited Rivera's termination due to her
childcare responsibilities.'' Although the CDDCA prohibits unlawful
acts that threaten public safety during times of emergency, the court
found no authority to suggest that it was a violation of the law or public
policy for Cherry Hill Convalescent Center to terminate Rivera for
absenteeism during a state of emergency. '82 Furthermore, the court
focused its application of its public policy inquiry on Rivera's specific
situation and found that Rivera's termination posed no threat to the
public welfare, notwithstanding the termination's negative consequences
for Rivera herself.' ' Finally, the court cited both Upton and Lloyd in
dismissing Rivera's argument that Cherry Hill Convalescent Center
174. Id. at 632.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. No. 04-2449, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30117 (D.N.J. May 17, 2006).
178. Id. at *6.
179. Id.
i8o. Id. at *9.
I8I. Id. at *I3-14.
182. Id. at *14.
183. Id. at *16.
[Vol. 59:1463
1489June 2008] LEGISLATING CAREGIVER DISCRIMINATION
violated public policy by forcing Rivera to choose between neglecting her
son while going to work and caring for her son but losing her job.8
Hundley v. Dayton Power & Light provides another example of a
court that declined to recognize a public policy exception to at-will
employment on the basis of caregiving responsibilities.' Dayton Power
& Light terminated B. Douglas Hundley after he requested a two-month
leave to care for his family when his wife and son were seriously injured
in a car accident.'86 Because he had been employed with Dayton Power &
Light for less than a year, FMLA did not apply, but Hundley argued that
his discharge violated the public policy underlying FMLA, as well as
those implicit in the Ohio statutes regarding parental duty to care for
children." The Ohio court held that neither FMLA, nor parental duty
statutes, established a clear public policy against terminating employees
for requesting time off to care for injured relatives. 8 The court cited
Upton and Lloyd in support of its holding.8 Especially pertinent was the
court's refusal to "expand upon the public policy contained in the
statutes" relied on by Hundley, concluding that if "we were to recognize
the public policy Hundley sets forth, we would in effect be creating
legislation, which is not the function of this court." 9 '
Most recently, the Washington Court of Appeals considered a
similar public policy argument in Ackerman v. Quilcene School District.'
When they dismissed Ackerman's wrongful termination claim, the court
noted that FRD was "conspicuously absent from the Legislature's list of
,unfair' discriminatory employment practices, ' 92 and held that the
Washington legislature had established no clear public policy against
family-status-based discrimination in employment.'93
In the vast majority of states, caregivers remain unprotected against
discrimination on the basis of family responsibilities because they lack
express statutory prohibitions against FRD. Some states have taken an
effective interim step toward establishing state public policy against
FRD. For example, New Hampshire has adopted laws that declare that
employment discrimination based on familial status is a "state concern"
184. Id. at *21-26.
185. 774 N.E.2d 330 (Ohio Ct. App. 2oo2).
186. Id. at 331-32.
187. Id. at 335.
188. Id. at 337.
189. Id.
19o. Id.
191. No. 29300-5-I1, 2003 Wash. App. LEXIS 7II (Wash. Ct. App. July 29, 2003).
192. Id. at *22. Additionally, the Washington court cites Peggie R. Smith in footnote 12, quoting
her proposition that, "'the evidence does not exist to indicate that employment discrimination against
parents based on erroneous assumptions is a serious problem."' Id. at *22 n.12 (citing Smith, Parental-
Status, supra note 8, at 573).
193. Id. at *23.
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and a "threat" to public safety and welfare.'94 These interim measures not
only lay a crucial foundation for ultimate acceptance by the public of
legislation prohibiting caregiver discrimination, they also articulate the
public policy that allows courts to uphold FRD public policy tort claims
until a basis for a separate statutory claim emerges.
CONCLUSION
Forging a new frontier in the law is never without challenges and
obstacles. By questioning the advisability of affording protection against
employment discrimination based on parental status, Professor Smith
forced advocates to address important legal concerns in the development
of broader based FRD legislation. Stereotyping research and the true
stories of employees nationwide compel the continuation of these
legislative efforts in order to eradicate workplace discrimination against
employees who are also parents, grandparents, or siblings providing care
for family members. The EEOC's recent acknowledgment of the unique
features of FRD cases signals that the time has come for FRD legislation
to play a more prominent role in what must be a comprehensive strategy
to ensure workplace fairness as well as work/life balance.
194. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:I (i995 & Supp. 2007).
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